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FELLOW-SERVANTS.
ONE of the most important rules in the law of negligence is that
a master is not liable to his servant for an injury caused by the
negligence of a.fellow-servant. The purpose of this paper is to show
the meaning of the term "fellow-servant," as used. in this rule.
It is not to be supposed that all the very numerous cases upon
this subject can be reconciled; the most that can be done is to
group them together in such a way as to show the different principles upon which they are based. Knowing these principles we can
see the reason. for the decision in any particular case.
The first instance of the application of the rule of fellow-servants
is found in the case of Afurray v. Railroad Co., 1 McMullen (S.
Ga.) 385 (1841); Priestleyv. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1 (1897), often
cited as the first case upon the subject, is not an authority as to
fellow-servants, for it is not stated therein by whose negligence the
injury to the servant was caused. In the South Carolina case a
fireman of a locomotive, injured by the negligende of the enginedr,
was held not entitled to recover from the common master, the
railway company ; the fireman and the engineer 'were fellowservants.
The next case, and the leading one upon the subject was Farwell
v. Railroad Co., 4 Metc. 49 (1842) ; here the defendant railway company was held not liable to one of its engineers for an injury caused
by the negligence of a switch-tender in its employ. In the opinion
of the court (SHAW, 0. J.), it is said: "They are appointed and
employed by the same company to perform separate and distinct
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duties, all tending to the accomplishment of one and the same purpose-that of the safe transmission of the trains." And again,
"1When the object to be accomplished is one and the same, when
the employers are one and the same, and the several persons
employed derive their compensation and authority from the same
source," the rule is to apply, and all such servants are fellowservants.
From a comparison of many cases upon the subject we may form
the following definition: All servanta employed by the same master,
working under the same control and in a common employment, are
fellow-servanits.
It thus appears that- those servants are fellow-servants who are
I. .Employed by the same master, andy
II. Under the same control, and
II. In a common employment.
It is therefore necessary to know who are, and who are not
regarded as falling within these terms.
L 'What servants are employed by the same master.-There is
generally little difficulty in determining this. Those servants whe
"derive their authority and compensation from the same source,"
are employed by the same master.
It is to be noted, however, that not every one who is employed
by another is a servant. An independent contractor to whom work
has been let out, and who has entire charge of such work, is not aservant. Therefore, he is not a fellow-servant of his cmployer's
servants: fayheu v. Mining Co., 76 Mle. 100 (1884). All servants of such a contractor are his only, and not those of the party
engaging the contractor. Hence, servants of the contractor and
those of the contractor's employers are not- fellow-servants,
because they are not servants of the same master; for example : a servant of a contractor engaged by a railroad company to build a wall alongsid- a road-bed, is not a fellowservant of the servants of the company in charge of a passing
train : Goodfellow v. -airoad Co., 106-Mass. 461 (1871) ; see also
Young v. RailroadCo., 30Barb. 229 (1859); Abraham v. Reynolds,
5 H. & N. 143 (1860). But if the employer of the contractor has
control and direction of the contractor's servants, such servants are
not servants of the contractor exclusively, but of the employer of
the contractor also; and hence they are fellow-servants of the
employer's other servants in the same employment: Johnston v-.
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Boston, It8 Mass. 114 (1875); Wiggett v. Fox, 1I Exch. 832,
(1856) ; Ewan v. Lippincott, 47 N. J.I,.R. 192 (1885).
II.What servants are under the same control.-Many of the
early cases regarded all servants* as- under the same control who
were employed hy the same master, for all such are subject to the
same ultimate authority. It did not matter what the relative ranks
of the servants might be; nor that one had the direction and control of the other; nor that one had power to hire and discharge the
other. In accordance with this view, a superintendent having the
entire charge of a factory, with authority to hire and discharge
the operatives, was held a fellow-servant with one of the latter:
Albro v. Agaurarn Canal Co., 6 Cush. 75 (185G).
Such a view as to what servants are under the same control does
not now generally prevail ; for there is this limitation put upon it:
Where the master takes no part in the business, but intrusts the
entire control and management to a superintendent or manager,
such person stands in the "place of the master, and is not a fellowservant of the servants under him. Such a person is often called a
vice-principal of the master-sometimes is said to be the master's
altereg. The meaning of these terms is the same-one who is put
by the master in the master's place and represents him towards the
other servants.
This principle is well expressed in these words: "When the
general management and control of an industrial enterprise is delegated to a superintendent with full power to hire and discharge
servants, to direct their labors and obtain and employ suitable means
and appliances for the conduct of the business, such superintendent
stands in the place of the master," and is not a fellow-servant of
those under his control: .Pantzar v. Mining Co., 99 N. Y. 868
(1885).
Instances of the application of this rule are numerous; the following cases illustrate it:
The owner of slaughter-yards employed an agent to manage them,
with full power over them and the workmen in them; the agent was
-held not a fellow-servant of a workman employed by him in the
yards: itchtell v. Robinson, 80 Ind. 281 (1881).
The owners of a cotton mill intrusted to a general superintendent
its entire charge and management, with power to purchase supplies
and to hire and discharge the operatives; such a superintendent was
not a fellow-servant of the operatives under his control: Corcoran
v. Holbrook, 59 N. Y. 517 (1875).
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Besides the above, the following late cases are directly in point:
Ryan v. Bagaley, 15 Mich. 179 (1883) - State v. Malster,57 Md.
287 (1881); Mayhew v. Mining Co., 76 Me. 100 (18.84) ; By. Co.
v. Jones, 86 Penn. St. 432 (1878).
The same principle was adopted in a number of-English cases
(see Murphy v. Smith, 19 0. B. (N. S.)-860 (1865)), and was
regarded as settledlaw until the case of Wilson v. Herry was decided
in the House of Lords in 1868, in which it was wholly rejected; L.
R., 1 H. L. 826. Lord BLACKBURN, commenting upon this case,
says: "The decision of the House of Lords is distinct that the fact
that the servant held the position of vice-principalship, does not
affect the non-liability of the master for his negligence as regards
a fellow-servant :" _fowell v. Steel Co., L. R., 10 Q. B. 62 (1874).
The later Massachusetts cases have approved of the rule adopted
in Albro v. Agawam Canal Co., above referred to; and hence the
English rule and the Massachusetts one is the same. According to
it, all servants are under the same'control who serve the same master, although the one may in fact occupy the master's place toward
the other; and the generally accepted idea of vice-principalship is
not recognised.
According to the great weight of opinion, the relation of fellowservants is not changed by the mere fact that one servant is of
higher rank in the service than the other, and has power to direct
and control him; (see cases following.) Unless one be a vice-principal, all servants of the same master are under the same control,
without regard to their relative grade. The most frequent instances
of this are the cases of foremen and conductors.
A foreman seldom has power to hire and. discharge workmen; he
does not act entirely upon his own judgment, being subject generally
to the orders and control of a superintendent: he works hand to
hand with those under him; in short, he has not the entire charge
and control of the business or any department of it. Hence, he is
generally held to be a fellow-servant with the workmen under his
direction. This has been in terms decided in the following casesthe latest upon this particular point : Doughty v. Penobscot Co., 76
Me. 143 (1884) ; Brick v. Rd. Co., 98 N. Y. 211 (1885); Canal
Co. v. Carroll, 89 Penn. St. 374 (1879); Indiana Car Co. v.
Parker, 100 Ind. 181 (1884); .Peschel v. Rd. Co., 62 Wis. 338
(1885); State v. lalster, 57 Md. 287 (1881).
Much the same is the position of a conductor of a railway train
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towards the other servants upon it; having-no general delegation
of authority over them, and not being_ given the entire charge of
any branch of- the business of running the road, he is considered,
by most of the cases, a fellow-servant of such other servants. The
latest cases deciding this point are : Cassidy v. RdR. 0o., 76 le.
488 (1884); Slater v. Jewet, 85 N. Y. 61 (1881); Smith v. Potter, 46 Mich. 258 (1881) ; Pease v. Ed. OCo., 61 Wis. 163 (1884).
But the rule that different ranks in service does not alter the
relation of fellow-servants as between servants of the same master
has not been universally accepted. A contrary view has been upheld in a number of states, and has been lately recognised and
adopted in the Supreme Court of the United States.
In Ohio, it has, long been settled that any one placed in authority over the servant, with power to control and direct him in the
performance of his duties, is the alter ego of the master; or as has
been more concisely said: "A servant is not a fellow-servant with
one to whom he is subordinate." Hence a foreman is held not a
fellow-servant of a workman under his control; a brakeman under
the control of a conductor of a train is not a fellow-servant of such
conductor: Railroad Ca. v. Keary, a Ohio St. 201 (1854); Rai7road Co. v. Lavalley, 36 Id.221 (1880).
In holding a foreman of a lumber yard of a railway company,
who had power to hire and -discharge the laborers under his control, not a fellow-servant of such laborers, the Supreme Court of
Illinois said: "When a railway corporation confers authority iLpon
one of its employees to take charge of and control a gang of men
in carrying on some particular branch of its business, such employee is the direct representative of the company" towards the
men under his control: Railroad Co. v. May, 108 Ill. 288
-

(1884).

In Tennessee it is said that '"the only sound rule is to hold the
common superior (in this case the railway company), which can
only act through its agents, responsible for all injuries resulting
to the subordinate from the negligence of his immediate superior,
or the party having control over him." And the court approves
of the remark of Judge REDFIELD, that " we would be content to
treat all subordinates who were under the control of a superior, as
entitled to hold such superior as representing the master:" Redfield on Railways, 1. 529 n.; Railroad Co. v. Bowler, 9 Hleisk.
866 (1872).
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The same rule prevails in North Carolina and Virginia: Cowles
v. Railroad Co., 84 N. 0. 309 (1881); Moon v. BailroadOo., 20
Cent. L. J. 83 (1885); s. v. 78 Va. T45.
The Supreme Court of the United States, by a divided court,
7
has adopted the same view in the case of Railroad
Co. v. Bose,
112 U. S. 377 (1884); s. c. 24 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 94. It is
there said: " There is, in our judgment, a clear distinction to be
made in their relation to their common principal, between servants
of a corporation exercising no supervision over others engaged with
them in the same employment, and agents of the corporation, clothed
with the control and management of a distinct department, in which
their duty is entirely that of supervision and direction. A conductor, having the entire control and management of a railway
train, occupies a very different position from the brakeman, the
porters and the others employed." And again: " The cornductor
of a railway train, who commands its movements, directs when it
shall start, at what stations it shall stop, at what speed it shall run,
and has the general management of it and control over the persons
employed upon it, represents the company," and is not a fellowservant of such other persops. And the court affirmed the ruling
of the judge below, that as the relation of superior and inferior
was created between the conductor and engineer in the operation
of the train, they were not fellow-servants within the reason of the
law.
How far this decision will be followed in the various states it is
of course, impossible to say. Its principle has been already adopted,
however, in the conservative state of Connecticut in a case in which
a train dispatcher and engineer were held not to be fellow-servants.
The court says: "To make no discrimination, but in all cases to
place those who are invested with authority to direct and control
on the same footing with those whose duty it is to merely perform
as directed without discretion and without responsibility, seems to
us unwise and impolitic :" Darrwigan v. Railroad Co., 52 Conn.
285 (1884); s. c. 24 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 452. And the court
fully approves of the principles of the English "Employers Liability
Act "
This Act (43 & 44 Vict. c. 42, 1880,) changes almost entirely
the rule laid down by the English courts, and provides, in substance, as follows, concerning this division of our subject: "Workmen or their representatives shall have a right of action against
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their employers for injuries or death happening I. By reason of
the negligence of any one having superintendence intrusted to
him. 2. By reason of the negligence of any person to whose
orders the workman was bound to conform."
It will be observed that this statute seems to be based upon the
principle which some of our courts have insisted upon as the
only just and wise one ; and that it aims to- bring about, by legis-i
lative act, that which those courts, guided by what they consider
proper policy, have accomplished of their own motion.
III. What ser-ants are in a common employment.-The rule
generally laid down in reference to this, is that all servants of the
same master, whose labors tend to the accomplishment of the same
general purpose, are in a common employment. Hence all servants
engaged in operating a mine, or railway, or factory, are within the
rule. It was argued by counsel in Farwellv. Railroad Co., before
referred to, that what is now known as the rule of fellow-servants,.
should not apply in cases where servants ares employed in different
departments of duty, having no connection with and at a distance
from one another, and where one could in no way observe or influence the conduct of the other. But to this the court replied that
the distinction would be very difficult to apply practicalfy; that to
distinguish one department, of duty from another would be impossible in many cases, and that therefore such a rule could not be
adopted.
This view has been strictly adhered to in Massachusetts ever
since the above case was decided.
In a late case, Holden . Bailroad Co., 129 Mass. 268 (1880), it was -said: "It is well settled
in this commonwealth and in Great Britain that the rule of fellowservants is not confined to the case of two servants working in
company, or having opportunities to control or influence the conduct of each other, but extends to every case in which the two,
deriving their authority and compensation from the same source, are
engaged in the same business, though in different departments of
duty."
In a noted English case, Bartonshill Coal Ceo. v. MuGuire, 3
Macq. II. L. 0. 300 (1858), a much more limited view -was taken.
It was said that "in each case it is necessary to ascertain'whether
the servants are fellow-laborers in the same work, and that where
servants are engaged in different departments of duty, an injury
committed by one servant upon another by carelessness or negli-
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gence in the course of his peculiar work, is not within the exemption." And in the same opinion, speaking of a case where the
Scotch court held that a carpenter engaged in repairing a railway
carriage was not in a common employment with an engine-driver
and the person who arranged the switches, Lord Chancellor
CHELMSFORD said.the case might be reconciled with the English
authorities, on the ground that the workmen were engaged in
totally different departments of duty.
Later English cases, however, rejected this view, and the settled
opinion came to be that servants are in a common employment
\,hough the object on which one is employed is "very dissimilar
from that on which the other is employed," and in the case of railway employees it is said that "whenever the employment is such
as necessarily to bring the person accepting it into contact with the
traffic of a line of railway" the rule of common employment is to
apply. The same principle governs in the-case of employees of any
industrial enterprise: Morgan v. Rd. C6., L. R., 1 Q. B. 149 (1865).
This view has been adopted in the courts of most of the states ;
and it can be stated as the general rule, that all servants of the
same master, engaged in the same general business, though in djifferent departments of it, are fellow-servants in a common employment.
The following cases are in point: an engineer of a locomotive is
in a common employment with a telegraph operator employed by
the railway company: Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61 (1881); the
managers of different departments of a mine, subject to the orders
of a general superintendent: Railroad Co. v. Jones, 86 Penn. St.
432 (1878); a track repairer and a fireman of a passing train: Dick
v. Railroad Co., 38 Ohio St. 889 (1882). See also to the same
effect, Smith v. Iron Co., 42 N. J. L. R. 467 (1880) ; -Doughtyv.
Penobscot Co., 76 Me. 143 (1884); Wonder v. Railroad Co., 32
Md. 411 (1870) ; Quine Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. 84 (1879) ; Roberts
v. Railroad Co., 33 Minn. 218 (1885).
But there are two limitations upon the rule just givv
One of
these is well settled ; the other is perhaps no more tlian a mere
denial of the general rule.
1. Those persons who are charged with the performance of a duty
which the master owes to his servants are not in a common employment with such servants.
2. Those servants, who though employed by the same master, and
working for the same general purpose are yet in such different kinds
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of service that they are not in a common employment with each
other.
1. "-The true rule is to hold the corporation [masterj liable for
negligence or want of proper care in respect to such acts and duties
as it is required to perform and discharge as master or principal,
without regard to the rank or title of the agent intrusted with their
performance; as to such acts the agent occupies the place of the
corporation:" Flike v. Railroad Ca., 53 N. Y. 549 (1873) ; see also
cases infra.
The chief class of cases under this limitation is that arising from
the negligence of servants employed to select safe and suitable
machinery and to keep it in repair. To select such machinery and
to keep it in repair is a duty which the master owes his servants;
all persons of whatever grade, to whom the master has intrusted
this duty are his personal representatives, and are not in a common
employment with those servants who use such machinery.
The leading case upon this point is Ford v. Rd. Co., 110 Mass.
240 (18721, in which it is-said: '"The agents, who are charged with
the duty of supplying safe machinery, are not to be regarded as
fellow-servants of those who arc engaged in operating it. They are
charged with the master's duty to his servant. They are employed
in distinct and independent departments of service." And further,
the master is "equally chargeable whether the negligence was in
originally failing to provide, or in afterwards failing to keep its
machinery in safe repair."
The rule is illustrated in the following cases. The mechanics to
whom the making of repairs in engines is intrusted, are not in a
common employment with an engineer: Fuller v. 7ewett, 80 N. Y.
46 (1880) ; the master of mechanics, whose duty it is to select and
purchase engines, is not in a common employment with a fireman:
Rd. Co. v. Moran, 44 Md. 283 (1875). See, also, the following
cases directly in point: Shanny v. Mills, 66 Me. 420 (1877); Rd.
Co. v. .Herert, 116 U. S. 642 (1886) ; Wilson v. TWillinantdc Co.,
50 Conn. 433 (1883); Brabbits v. Rd. Co., 38 Wis. 289 (1875);
Rd. Co. v. Avery, 109 Ill. 314 (1884); Rd. Co. v. Leslie, S. C.
Penn., 20 Rep. 55 (1885).
Another duty which the master owes his servants is that of selecting and employing competent fellow-servants; and it is held, that
those agents to whom this duty is intrusted are not in a common
VOL. XXXIV.-62
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employment with the other servants, because they are charged with
the master's duty towards his servants.
A superintendent intrusted with the duty of employing conductors, employed an incompetent one; the superintendent is not a
fellow-servant of an engineer injured by the negligence of the conductor: Bd. Co. v. -Decker, 84 Penn. St. 419 (1877). Se6, also, to
the same effect: Mann v. Rd. Co., 91 N.. Y. 495 (1883); Quincy
Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. 34 (1879).
Another duty which the master, where a railway company, owes
the servants, is the duty of keeping the road-bed in proper repair
Hence, those who are-charged with-this duty are not fellow-servants
with those who use the road-bed. Hence, it is held that a bridgebuilder and road-master are not fellow-servants of a fireman injured
through the negligence of the former in failing to properly inspect
and 'care for a culvert of the road-bed of a railway: Davis v. Bd
Co., 55 Vt. 84 (1882). See also, Drymala v. Thomvson, 26 Minn.
40 (1879).
There are, of course, other duties which a master owes to his
servants : as, the duty of providing a safe place to work in ; the
duty of supplying a suffici.ent number of servants for the safe carrying on of the business in hand. In regard to these and other duties
it is not doubted that those intrusted with their performance will
be held not to be in a common employment with the other servants,
when proper cases are presented to the courts.
It sometimes is a question, whether or not certain acts are acts
which it is the duty of the master to perform, and for the negligent
performance of which he is to be held responsible to his servants.
For example : the inspection of railway cars has been held in some
courts to be a duty of the master to his servants, but in others has
been held not to be. Hence, decisions as to whether those charged
with this duty are in a common employment with other servants or
not, are conflicting, depending upon the view the court takes as to
its being a master's duty or not. The discussion of this. however,
is foreign to our subject: Tierney v. Rd. Co., 33- Minn. :511 (1885);
s. c.24 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 669; Smith v. Potter, 46 Mich.
258 (1881).
2. We have seen what the general view is as to the meaning
of "common employment," and what servants are considered as
within its terms. In the face of that view our second limitation
seems a mere contradiction. Yet it is adopted by a. number of
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learned courts, and is entitled to consideration. It is, in brief, that
servants of the same master may be in such different departments of
the same general business that they are not to be held. fellowservants.
In Bairdv.Pettit,70 Penn. St. 477 (1872), the defendant's business was the manufacture of locomotives, and the plaintiff was in
his employ as draughtsman; the latter was injured by the negligence of carpenters working about the buildings. " The workmen
by whose negligence he was injured were not engaged in the manufacture of engines nor in the performance of-any service connected
with the business ;" they were, therefore, not in a common employment with the plaintiff.
This is plainly a departure from the rule hereinafter stated ; other
courts have gone still further.
In Illinois, it is held that to constitute common employment "it
is essential that the servants were actually co-operating at the time
of the injury in the particular business in hand, or that their usual
duties should bring them into habitual consociation, so that proper
caution would be likely to result." Hence, a fireman upon a locomotive and a track-repairer are not in a common employment: Railroad Co. v. Moranda, 93111. 302 (1&79) ; RailroadCb. v. O'Connor,
77 Id. 391 (1875).
In Kentucky, it is said that common laborers "in their employment having nothing to do with the cars or the running of them,
are like the corporation's mere wood-choppers, comparative strangers
to the engineer and his running operations. They are, therefore,
' not in the same service' with the engineer and. his co-operators
who are in a different sphere, and constitute a distinct class :"
Railroad Co v. Collins, 2 Duvall 114 (1865); s. c. 78 Va. 745.
Cases in Tennessee and Virginia are to the same effect; Railroad
Co. v. Carroll,6 Heisk. 347 (1871); Moon v. Railroad Co., 20
Cent. L. J. 33 (1885).
In the case of Randall v. Railroad Co., 109 U. S. 428 (1883),
the Supreme Court of the United States seems to have indicated,
by implication at least, a leaning towards the same view. It is
there said of two servants, who were held fellow-servants, "The
duties of the two bring them to work at the same place, at the same
time, so that the negligence of one in doing his work may injure the
other in doing his work. Their separate services have an immediate common object-the moving of the trains." This would seem
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to imply that if their duties did not bring them to work at the
same time and place, and if their separate services didc not have an
immediate common object, they would not be in the same employment, and this view has been taken in a Federal Circuit Court in a
case which decides that "a common hand engaged in distributing
nails alongside of a track, and under the control of a foreman, is
not in the same employment as a man controlling and managing a
switch-engine not used in carrying these nails, but in moving from
one place to another cars not engaged in the business of relaying
said tracks: Garrahyv. Railroad Go., 25 Fed. Rep. 258 (1885).
The English "Employers Liability Act," before referred to, provides, in substance, concerning this division of our subject, that "-a
'workman or his representatives shall have a right of action against
his employer for injuries or death happening, 1. By reason of
defects in ways, works, machinery or plant, arising from an
employee's negligence.
2. By reason of the negligetice of any
employee, having charge or control of any signal, points, locomotive engine or train upon a railway.
These provisions place the employees referred to in them in different employments from the other servants of the master, thus
changing materially the rules laid down by the English cases.
Taking these provisions in connection with those before referred to,
the act almost entirely abolishes the law of fellow-servants in
England.
It is not very creditable to the English judges that Parliament
has almost wholly done away with, provisionally at least, a rule
which is entirely judge-made; which has been insisted upon as
founded in justice and required by expediency, and which has been
extended and broadened for forty years, in pursuance of a policy
which has now been abolished by Parliament as unwise and unjust.
The law as to fellow-servants may be summarized as follows:
In Great Britain the common-law rules have been almost wholly
abolished by statute.
The same thing has been done, as regards railway employees, in
Georgia: Rev. Code, sect. 2083, 3036; Wisconsin: Rev. Stat.,
sect. 1816; Kansas: Compiled Laws, sect. 5204, and Iowa: Rev.
Code, sect. 1307.
In Massachusetts all servants of the same master are fellowservants, except that those who select and repair machinery are not
fellow-servants of those who use it.

